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The introduction of packet-switched telephony in the form of VoIP raises concerns about current
regulatory practice. Access regulation has been designed for traditional telephony on PSTN
networks. In this paper, we analyze the effect of access regulation and retail price regulation of
PSTN networks on the adoption of a new technology in the form of VoIP. In particular, we show
that with endogenous consumer choice between PSTN and VoIP telephony, higher prices for
terminating access to the PSTN network make VoIP less likely to succeed and lead to lower
proﬁts of operators that offer VoIP telephony exclusively.
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Abstract in Dutch
De introductie van pakketgeschakelde telefonie in de vorm van VoIP leidt tot zorgen over de
huidige vorm van regulering. Toegangsregulering is ooit ontworpen voor traditionele telefonie
op PSTN-netwerken. In dit paper analyseren we de effecten van toegangs- en
eindgebruikersprijsregulering van PSTN-netwerken op de adoptie van een nieuwe technologie in
de vorm van VoIP. In het bijzonder laten we zien, onder endogene consumentenkeuzen tussen
PSTN en VoIP, dat hogere tarieven voor gespreksafgifte op het PSTN-netwerk leiden tot een
lagere kans van slagen voor VoIP en tot lagere winsten van operators die alleen VoIP aanbieden.
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56Summary
With the emergence of voice telephony based on the Internet protocol (IP), generally known as
“voice over IP”or VoIP, the telecommunications landscape is rapidly changing.This new
technology, which is fundamentally different from telephony over the public switched telephone
network (PSTN), is providing a new impetus to local loop unbundling (LLU) and also stimulates
entry into telephony markets by cable operators. Incumbent operators are facing a serious threat,
and face the question of whether they should milk the PSTN as long as possible, or introduce
VoIP at the cost of cannibalizing PSTN revenues, in the hope of at least partially deterring entry
of new operators.
This paper explores imperfect competition between an incumbent and an entrant. While the
incumbent, with a history in PSTN telephony, has a complete local access network,the entrant is
either a cable operator with a full-coverage broadband network or a newcomer who uses LLU to
reach end-users.The incumbent offers PSTN voice telephony to one segment of customers, as
well as VoIP services to another segment, while the entrant only offers VoIP services in the latter
segment. We consider endogenous migration between the segments, so that consumers can
choose between staying with the PSTN network versus adopting VoIP services. Since consumers
have to change equipment at their premises, migration decisions are “lumpy ”and thus not based
on expected prices.
In this set-up, we explore competition in a market for voice telephony between an incumbent
trying to balance its tactics with regard to PSTN and VoIP telephony, and an entrant without ties
to the past. In particular, we analyze the effects of PSTN regulation. Regulatory authorities in
Europe are currently struggling with the question whether they should restrict the incumbent´s
activities with regard to VoIP, or refrain from intervening so that the market will determine how
this new technology will develop. Regulation may be necessary in order to prevent
anticompetitive behavior, but on the other hand, intervening may easily distort the development
and adoption processes of innovation.
Our key ﬁndings are as follows. The ﬁrst one relates to retail pricing. The PSTN retail price
only affects competition in the VoIP segment as a consequence of the endogenous nature of
consumers´technology adoption decisions. An important result is that, as long as the PSTN
access price is positive, a higher price for PSTN telephony leads to lower prices for VoIP
telephony. Only for an access price equal to zero, the retail price level of PSTN telephony does
not affect retail prices for VoIP telephony. These results illustrate the links between different
telephony networks,links that should not be ignored by regulators. These links have been
explored in detail. Suppose that an entrant in the VoIP market faces a positive access price. This
access price may or may not reﬂect marginal cost levels; it is only important that this access
price is positive. Then a lower regulated PSTN price leads to a smaller customer base for VoIP
telephony and softens price competition among VoIP operators.
7Our second ﬁnding relates to access pricing. Access regulation on the PSTN network affects the
VoIP market. For instance, if the incumbent charges for call termination on the PSTN and VoIP
networks use bill-and-keep, then a higher access price for call termination on the PSTN network
leads to a smaller customer base for VoIP telephony. In the context of access price regulation it
is important that regulators take into account these linkages between different market segments,
and that regulation within one segment may have spillover effects to other segments. In markets
in which the PSTN retail price is not regulated (and in which an incumbent enjoys market
power), a higher access price leads to higher VoIP retail prices (as in the regulated case) but
tends to lead to lower retail prices in the PSTN segment. This suggests that regulation has
winners and losers: consumers of the “old ”technology are the winners from a high access price
(which can be seen as a protective measure for the old technology) and consumer of the “new
”technology are the losers.
81 Introduction
With the emergence of voice telephony based on the Internet protocol (IP), generally known as
“voice over IP” or VoIP, the telecommunications landscape is rapidly changing. This new
technology, which is fundamentally different from telephony over the public switched telephone
network (PSTN), is providing a new impetus to local loop unbundling (LLU) and also stimulates
entry into telephony markets by cable operators. Incumbent operators are facing a serious threat,
and face the question of whether they should milk the PSTN as long as possible, or introduce
VoIP at the cost of cannibalizing PSTN revenues, in the hope of at least partially deterring entry
of new operators.
This paper explores imperfect competition between an incumbent and an entrant. While the
incumbent, with a history in PSTN telephony, has a complete local access network, the entrant is
either a cable operator with a full-coverage broadband network or a newcomer who uses LLU to
reach end-users.1 The incumbent offers PSTN voice telephony to one segment of customers, as
well as VoIP services to another segment, while the entrant only offers VoIP services in the latter
segment. We consider endogenous migration between the segments, so that consumers can
choose between staying with the PSTN network versus adopting VoIP services.2 Since
consumers have to change equipment at their premises, migration decisions are “lumpy” and
thus not based on expected prices.
In this set-up, we explore competition in a market for voice telephony between an incumbent
trying to balance its tactics with regard to PSTN and VoIP telephony, and an entrant without ties
to the past. In particular, we analyze the effects of PSTN regulation. Regulatory authorities in
Europe are currently struggling with the question whether they should restrict the incumbent’s
activities with regard to VoIP, or refrain from intervening so that the market will determine how
this new technology will develop. Regulation may be necessary in order to prevent
anticompetitive behavior, but on the other hand, intervening may easily distort the development
and adoption processes of innovation.
We address regulation of terminating access as well as the effects that the PSTN retail price
may have on market outcomes in the VoIP segment. Accordingly, we do not consider regulation
of the VoIP market itself, but look at the broader regulatory picture, which may partly be
motivated by considerations of a universal service obligation in the PSTN market, or by market
power with regard to call termination on the PSTN. Within the European regulatory framework
for communications markets, such considerations—which may be legitimate in a relatively
1 This is in line with the view that “[...] the real threat to incumbents comes more from cable operators offering cheap (or
‘free’) VoIP services than from pure-play VoIP companies” (The Economist, “Your Television is Ringing - A Survey of
Telecoms Convergence”, October 14, 2006, p. 10).
2 We assume that there is full coverage, i.e., all consumers subsribe to either PSTN or VoIP telephony. See De Bijl and
Peitz (2006) for an analysis of partial market coverage in a setting that focuses on unbundling.
9isolated context—can easily trigger regulatory interventions, such as regulation of the
incumbent’s access price. However, because of network interconnection, regulators should be
aware of the effects that they may have on emerging markets. For a recent policy document on
this, see OECD (2006).3 Our aim is to articulate some of the most salient side effects of current
regulatory interventions.
The case of imperfect competition is more realistic than a more stylized set-up with a
competitive fringe that needs to purchase the essential input from the incumbent. In practice,
entry immediately tends to generate some discipline on incumbents. In such a situation,
supposing that VoIP operators use “bill-and-keep” or some other predetermined scheme for call
termination, we analyze the competitive effects of terminating access at the PSTN network. In
particular, we consider access that is not priced at its marginal cost level. The key insight is that
a change of the access price not only generates direct but also indirect cost effects, since it
triggers changes in market shares which feed back into changes in perceived marginal costs.
This implies that VoIP adoption strongly relies on the level of the terminating access price to the
PSTN segment. We will summarize our main results in the concluding section of the paper.
Terminating access in telecommunications networks has been recently analyzed in situations
in which operators need mutual access. This literature on two-way access includes the seminal
papers by Armstrong (1998) and Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998); overviews are provided by
Laffont and Tirole (2000), Armstrong (2002), Vogelsang (2003), and Peitz, Valletti and Wright
(2004). Our paper builds on that literature by analyzing the emergence of VoIP networks in a
PSTN environment, in which the PSTN and VoIP networks are interconnected. In such an
environment, “metering” of call trafﬁc may still make sense on the PSTN, but this tends to be
different for VoIP calls. Hence the natural starting point is to consider the case in which VoIP
operators do not charge for call termination.
Access pricing in a situation of one-way access and imperfect competition (with regulated
access prices) has been analyzed by Laffont and Tirole (1994, 1996), Armstrong and Vickers
(1998), Lewis and Sappington (1999) and De Bijl and Peitz (2007), among others. Here, access
prices can be used as a regulatory instrument to affect retail price levels. If, in particular, the
regulator can set different rates for a bottleneck owner and a non-integrated competitor, the
regulator may want to subsidize the competitor at the margin to increase competitive pressure
(Ebrill and Slutsky, 1990; Lewis and Sappington, 1999). In addition, in an asymmetric market
the regulator may want to use the access price to favour the more efﬁcient ﬁrm (Armstrong and
Vickers, 1998; Lewis and Sappington, 1999; De Bijl and Peitz, 2007).4
3 We will see later that some of the views in OECD (2006), on the link between the PSTN access price and the intensity of
competition in the VoIP market, may lead to the wrong conclusions.
4 The economics literature has also looked at bypass possibilities (see e.g. Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers, 1996; Laffont
and Tirole, 1994, 1996). Although VoIP can substitute PSTN telephony, it does not allow for full bypass as long as some
consumers stay with PSTN. In our model, with full penetration of VoIP the access problem disappears, whereas at any
intermediate situation, terminating access to PSTN remains relevant and bypass is not possible.
10Complementary to our paper is Foros (2004). To consider the retail market for Internet access,
he models a situation of a vertically integrated ﬁrm controlling both local access and providing
broadband access, and a downstream Internet retailer. The integrated ﬁrm can invest in the
capacity of local connections, and given the outcome of that decision, the regulator chooses an
access price. The focus of the paper is mainly on regulation as a way to induce the integrated
ﬁrm to invest efﬁciently and to deter it from foreclosing the market. Independently written but
closely related is Hansen (2006). He addresses regulatory concerns with respect to the migration
from ﬁxed to mobile in a model with two-part tariffs. In the light of the emergence of IP-based
telephony, we look at ﬂat fees, which are becoming more widespread in use.5 Advantages of our
approach are that (i) we provide explicit solutions for equilibrium values, (ii) our comparative
statics results are global, and (iii) we allow for asymmetries between networks. Furthermore, our
approach allows us to endogenize all retail prices.
Our ﬁnding that the incumbent in many environments beneﬁts from a high access price also
connects to the literature addressing the proﬁtability of selling an upstream good to a
downstream rival, and the incentives to reduce the quality of access; see Reiffen (1998) and
Weisman (1998) for a useful discussion. In that literature, discrimination by a vertically
integrated ﬁrm (whose access price is regulated) may be proﬁtable if the ﬁrms sells close
substitutes in the downstream market, and if discrimination is not too costly. We don’t consider
an upstream and a downstream market, but (i) an incumbent who sells two downstream services,
namely PSTN and VoIP telephony, whereas the entrant is active in the VoIP segment only, and
(ii) we consider endogenous consumer migration between the segments. Access to the PSTN
network in our model is a “one-way” essential input to the extent that we assume that the entrant
provides terminating access at no cost. However, since PSTN and VoIP are substitutes, the
degree to which this essential input is demanded by the entrant is endogenous and the entrant’s
perceived marginal cost depends positively on the PSTN market share. This is the key feature of
our model, which is absent in the literature on discrimination by a vertically integrated ﬁrm.
This paper also contributes to the theory on multiproduct ﬁrms in a multidimensional product
space; for a review, see Manez and Waterson (2001). We provide a tractable model of
multiproduct competition which allows for endogenous formation of market segments and can
be solved analytically.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 motivates and presents the model. In
section 3, the model is analyzed. Section 4 concludes the paper and summarizes the results.
5 E.g., in The Economist: “[...] many operators have now done away with call charges altogether and instead offer
unlimited local, national and even some international calls for a ﬂat monthly fee.” (“Your Television is Ringing - A Survey of
Telecoms Convergence”, October 14, 2006, p. 10).
11122 The model
2.1 Introductory remarks
In the light of the wide number and variety of IP-based telephony products and services, let us
clarify the focus of our paper. Our model depicts various competitive situations with an
incumbent and an entrant. For instance, it may depict a situation of IP-based transport at the
edges of traditional networks, allowing for IP-based offerings from traditional operators. In such
a situation, PSTN operators have upgraded their local connections to digital subscriber lines
(DSL), enabling broadband Internet access and voice-over-broadband (VoB), for instance
offered in a bundle. The model may also depict the roll-out of completely IP-based “next
generation networks”, such as BT’s 21st Century Network. In our set-up, this implies that the
incumbent is upgrading its network from a PSTN to an all-IP network; during this transition, it
offers both PSTN and IP-based telephony.
The model allows for entrants with or without a local network. One possibility is that there is
a cable operator (hence an operator with its own local network) offering IP-based services. This
is feasible as cable operators may adapt their local lines so that they can carry high-speed
two-way trafﬁc, enabling broadband Internet access as well as VoIP telephony. Another option is
that the entrant does not have a local network but makes use of local loop unbundling (LLU).6 If
the incumbent’s local network is unbundled, entrants without their own local loops can lease
unbundled local lines from the incumbent and offer broadband Internet access or VoIP services
to end-users. A third possibility, which is very similar to LLU, is that an entrant without a local
network makes use of the incumbent’s network through a form of access known as “bitstream
access”. Also, we assume that if a customer switches to a LLU-based entrant, he or she
completely substitutes the PSTN service with the entrant’s VoIP service. Hence our analysis
captures “naked” DSL (also known as “standalone” DSL), a service proposition in which an
entrant provides only a broadband Internet connection based on DSL (typically priced at a ﬂat
rate) by leasing only the broadband part of the frequency spectrum of the copper wire.
Accordingly, the narrowband part of the line is no longer used.
The emergence of VoIP may radically change operators’ wholesale deals on call termination.
With IP-based telephony, the rationale behind termination charges is undermined, as the
marginal cost of call termination is drastically reduced, and VoIP calls are often not metered
anymore. Nevertheless, calls from an entrant’s VoIP network to the incumbent’s PSTN network
are delivered at a traditional circuit-switched interconnection point or through a “gateway”,
which allows for straightforward identiﬁcation of incoming calls, and, hence, for termination
6 For an overview of the development of LLU throughout Europe and the European regulatory framework, see De Bijl and
Peitz (2005).
13charges. Accordingly, for calls from an IP-network to a PSTN, a VoIP provider may have to pay
for call termination. Such charges inﬂate the perceived marginal cost for the VoIP provider. In
the case of calls from one IP-based network to another, operators may ﬁnd it more efﬁcient to
implement “bill-and-keep” (reciprocal settlement-free call termination), in line with the
packet-based nature of VoIP that, to a certain extent, eliminates the logic of metering incoming
calls.
In the main part of our analysis, we suppose that the incumbent charges for call termination
on its PSTN, and that no termination charges are used for termination to VoIP customers. This is
in line with the observation that the cost for termination at the PSTN is typically seen as being
positive, whereas call termination on IP-based networks comes virtually without a cost.7 Hence,
we acknowledge the technological characteristics of the new technology, and based on that, try
to derive (prescriptive) regulatory implications. Moreover, by doing so, a priori we treat market
segments (i.e., technologies) in an asymmetric way. Practice may be different, though; in the
Netherlands in the recent past, incumbent KPN charged the same access charge for all call
termination (whether terminating on PSTN or IP). Call termination on all other networks is
regulated at the same level as KPN’s except for cost differences due to economies of scale.8 To
model this situation would require a modiﬁcation of our model, with the following features: for
the incumbent, the difference between PSTN and VoIP would largely become ineffective, while
the two ﬁrms would be regulated asymmetrically (being allowed to charge different access
markups). The situation would then closely resemble asymmetric access regulation while
ignoring the technological asymmetry between the segments; a situation which has been
explored e.g. in De Bijl and Peitz (2002a, b).
2.2 Description of the model
There are two ﬁrms, an incumbent (operator 1) and an entrant (operator 2). The incumbent has a
local access network which can be used for PSTN-based telephony as well as IP-based telephony
(VoIP). For instance, its local connections have been upgraded to allow for Digital Subscriber
Line (DSL) technology, and its (long-distance) backbone to an IP-based network. The entrant
uses only IP-based technology to offer voice services. The entrant may be a cable operator with
a full-coverage broadband network. Alternatively, it may be using LLU to reach end-users, that
is, it leases unbundled local connections from the incumbent. In the latter case, we assume that
the line rental of the local loop is regulated at a cost-based level, so that the entrant is on an equal
7 Such a structure of access prices may be a good approximation of the outcome of negotiations between VoIP and PSTN
operators. As stated in an OECD report (OECD, 2006, p. 26), “...it seems likely in reality that VoIP operators might not
charge PSTN operators for IP termination while PSTN operators would still charge VoIP operators for the same call in the
opposite direction, due to the VoIP providers’ weaker negotiation power.”
8 Private communication with regulator OPTA.
14footing as the incumbent. This assumption allows us to abstract from regulatory issues related to
the wholesale price of LLU. All networks are interconnected, so that any consumer can make
calls to any other consumer. Consumers who use the “old” PSTN technology are said to belong
to the old segment, while consumers who decide to migrate to the “new” VoIP technology are
said to belong to the new segment.
The retail price in the old segment is assumed to be given by p0 (it is endogenized in section
3.3). For instance, it is set by the regulator or it may be determined by the presence of a
competitive fringe in PSTN telephony (e.g. carrier-select based competitors competing on
price).9 Thus we can treat p0 as a parameter. In the new segment, the operators compete by
setting ﬂat fees. Operator i’s retail price for VoIP telephony is denoted by pi, i = 1,2. Market
shares in the segment of the new technology depend on the retail prices, and are denoted by
si(p1,p2), i = 1,2. They will be shown to be continuously differentiable in prices.10
We assume zero marginal costs of call termination on a VoIP network.11 Also, operators do
not charge for call termination to a VoIP customer.12 The marginal cost of call termination on
the PSTN network is c > 0, and the incumbent charges a termination charge a for call
termination to its PSTN customers. Without loss of generality, we set all other costs equal to
zero. Access price a is set by a regulator.13 Since we do not explicitly model the regulator as a
player, access price a is an exogenous parameter in our model.
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their reluctance to use a new rather than an
established technology. The incumbent offers PSTN-based voice telephony to customers with
little technological savvy (the old segment), as well as VoIP to the new segment which is open to
a new technology, while the entrant only aims at the latter segment by offering VoIP. The group
of old consumers is of size λ0 and the other consumer group of size λ (for now, we will suppress
9 Even if no actual retail regulation is in place the threat of regulatory intervention may effectively be reﬂected by an upper
bound on the PSTN retail price. When this upper bound is binding our actual analysis applies. An alternative justiﬁcation
for a ﬁxed retail price can be provided in an extended model: Suppose that there is an additional group of consumers with
rather homogeneous valuations for PSTN telephony, who either subscibe to PSTN telephony or do not subscribe at all.
Under some parameter restrictions, it is proﬁt-maximizing for the incumbent to serve all those consumers. This effectively
means that the retail price for PSTN telephony can be taken as given.
10 This implies that the ﬁrms’ offerings are imperfect substitutes, which seems to be common in telecommunications (as
well as other services markets), for instance due to heterogeneity in brand recognition, corporate images, and consumer
switching costs. Also, services offered by operators are offered in different bundles with other services: if the bundles are
not the same, they will be considered as imperfect substitutes.
11 The “true” marginal costs of electronic communications are virtually zero. Nevertheless, in practice, operators allocate
ﬁxed costs to trafﬁc, and hence may partly treat these costs as marginal costs when setting prices. Thus, what we call the
marginal cost of call termination is in fact the trafﬁc-dependent cost of call termination. These costs are substantially lower
for IP networks than for PSTN networks, and therefore we set them at 0 for VoIP calls.
12 This is in line with the tendency of VoIP providers to use “bill-and-keep” arrangements for call termination, and with the
fact that interconnection typically has already been settled at the underlying level of Internet service providers.
13 For instance, the regulator has determined that the incumbent has “signiﬁcant market power” in the wholesale access
market, and because of that, and in line with the regulatory framework that is in place, applies price controls (this
illustration corresponds to the situation in member states of the European Union).
15notation expressing the dependence on retail prices). The total size of the market is normalized
to 1, so that λ0+λ = 1. More precisely, there is a continuum of consumers with mass 1. For
instance, consumers in the old segment are narrowband users, whereas consumers in the new
segment are broadband users.
Consumers’ utility functions: Consumer tastes are described by types (y,t), uniformly
distributed on [0,1]×[0,1]. The y dimension describes preferences for operator 1 versus
operator 2 (or their brands), and the t dimension reﬂects consumers’ inclinations towards VoIP
versus PSTN. A straightforward interpretation is that y captures consumers’ loyalty towards
operator 1, independent of the service that they purchase. With regard to the other dimension of
a consumer’s type, if a consumers has type t close to 0 this means that he is more inclined to
adopt VoIP, whereas a consumer with t close to 1 is rather reluctant to adopt VoIP. The distance
between the addresses of the products and consumer types give the disutility of consumers for
the particular offerings, as will be speciﬁed below. VoIP services are “located” at points (0,0)
and (1,0), and the PSTN service at (0,1) (in fact, with a properly adjusted U0 the latter could be
any point for which the second coordinate is 1). Note that in our setting y not only plays a role
when consumers choose between VoIP services, but also when consumers decide whether to
purchase PSTN or VoIP services.
Given a ﬂat fee, each consumer may make some number of calls of varying length. We
assume that the average number of call minutes per consumer is independent of type (y,t).
Without loss of generality, we normalize this number to 1. Moreover, when a consumer makes a
call, the receiving consumer may be any other consumer with equal probability, independent of
the network they are subscribed to. Accordingly, calling patterns are balanced: the volumes of
on-net and off-net calls are proportionate to market shares. This assumption, which is common
in the literature, simpliﬁes the analysis and can be seen as the natural benchmark.14
Consumers either subscribe to the PSTN service offered by the incumbent ﬁrm or to one of
the two VoIP offerings. A consumer who purchases PSTN services derives utility
r +U0−τ(1−t)−θy − p0, where r is the basic utility from telephony andU0 ∈ R is interpreted
as a technology-speciﬁc utility of PSTN-services relative to VoIP services (which may also
include the ﬁrm-speciﬁc utility, see below). Parameters τ and θ measure the degree of
heterogeneity among consumers: a large τ corresponds to a low substitutability between PSTN
and VoIP, and a large θ corresponds to a large degree of differentiation between the operators.
A consumer who purchases VoIP services from ﬁrm 1 derives utility r +U1−τt −θy − p1,
whereU1 ∈ R is a brand or ﬁrm-speciﬁc utility capturing the asymmetry between operators.
Similarly, a customer of ﬁrm 2 derives utility r −τt −θ(1−y)− p2. We will implicitly assume
14 Our model is rich enough to capture some crucial elements of the strategic interaction between PSTN and VoIP
providers. See Armstrong (2002; section 4.2.1), De Bijl and Peitz (2002a; section III), and De Bijl and Peitz (2002b,
section 6.3) for analyses of two-way access problems in which, as in our model, consumers have balanced calling
patterns and face ﬂat fees.
16that all consumers make a purchase, i.e. r is sufﬁciently large.
Proﬁt functions, structure of the game and equilibrium: Before consumers learn VoIP prices,
they form beliefs about these prices, and based on these beliefs, they decide whether to choose
VoIP or PSTN. This is motivated by the observation that technology adoption is a lumpy
decision that cannot be easily reversed if actual prices change (however, it is easy to change the
provider for a given technology).15
Consumers share the same beliefs about VoIP prices. Moreover, as we restrict the analysis to
pure strategies, consumer beliefs can be described by a function that attaches probability 1 to
one particular price level b pi for ﬁrm i, and probability 0 to all other prices pi 6= b pi. To keep the
notation simple, we denote beliefs by b p1 and b p2.
The speciﬁcation of the proﬁt functions of the operators then follows directly from our
assumptions.
π1(p1,p2;a,p0) = λ0(p0, b p1, b p2)[p0−λ0(p0, b p1, b p2)c]+λ(p0, b p1, b p2)
×[s1(p1,p2)(p1−λ0(p0, b p1, b p2)c)+s2(p1,p2)λ0(p0, b p1, b p2)(a−c)],
π2(p1,p2;a,p0) = λ(p0, b p1, b p2)s2(p1,p2)(p2−λ0(p0, b p1, b p2)a).
Proﬁt levels reﬂect the volumes of on-net and off-net trafﬁc between operator 1’s PSTN network
and both operators’ VoIP networks—volumes that are proportionate to market shares—as well
as the wholesale payments for calls terminating on the PSTN network. Note that the entrant’s
perceived marginal costs depend on the endogenously determined market share λ0 which in turn
depends on (expected) retail prices.
The model has the following time structure:
t = 0: The regulator sets access price a and PSTN price p0 (or alternatively, p0 is determined
by a competitive fringe in the retail market for PSTN telephony), observed by all players.
t = 1: Each consumer learns his or her preference parameter t ∈ [0,1], reﬂecting an
individual’s inclination towards PSTN versus VoIP. All consumers form expectations about
VoIP prices b p1 and b p2.
t = 2: Given their preferences and beliefs, consumers choose between PSTN and VoIP. At
the same time, the operators (simultaneously) set VoIP prices p1 and p2.
t = 3: Each consumer learns his or her preference parameter y ∈ [0,1], reﬂecting an
individual’s inclination towards operator 1 versus operator 2. Consumers observe prices p1
and p2 and make purchase decisions, that is, they choose VoIP telephony from the incumbent
or from the entrant if they opted for VoIP at t = 2. Otherwise, they choose PSTN telephony
from the incumbent. Consequently, market shares and proﬁt levels are realized.
15 Another possibility would be that consumers decide after observing prices and their own taste parameters. See the
concluding section for a discussion of this alternative speciﬁcation.
17We solve for fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium, that is, (i) each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts while
taking consumers’ beliefs and its rival’s strategy as given; (ii) based on beliefs b p1 and b p2,
consumers choose the utility maximizing technology; (iii) consumers’ beliefs are fulﬁlled, so
that equilibrium prices p∗
1 and p∗
2 satisfy p∗
1 = b p1 and p∗
2 = b p2, and given the observed prices,
consumers who have migrated to VoIP choose the operator that maximizes their utility.16
Surplus levels. To be able to discuss the effects of regulation on consumer surplus and
welfare, we provide the formulas for calculating various surplus levels in the model. The
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2 Aggregate consumer surplus is equal to
CS =CSPSTN+CSVoIP
1 +CSVoIP
2 . Producer surplus is equal to aggregate proﬁts: PS = π∗
1 +π∗
2.
Welfare is then deﬁned as the sum of consumer and producer surplus: W =CS+PS. Note that
since technologies and operators differ in their respective costs and gross surplus offered,
different allocations lead to different welfare levels. As we see in the next section, the
equilibrium allocation is affected by regulation.
16 It is formally equivalent to analyze subgame perfect equilibria in a game in which, at stage t = 2a, consumers ﬁrst
decide simultaneously between PSTN and VoIP, and, at stage t = 2b, operators set VoIP prices. See the previous version,
De Bijl and Peitz (2006), for a discussion.
183 Analysis
3.1 Main results
We start by looking at consumers’ choices at the last stage, t = 3, for those consumers who have
chosen to adopt VoIP. The consumer who is indifferent between the two VoIP services is located
at location y, given byU1−θy − p1 = −θ(1−y)− p2. All consumers characterized by
parameter y < y subscribe to operator 1’s service, and all others to operator 2. Accordingly, if a













Note that ifU1 ≥ θ, operator 2 must price below operator 1 to capture any market share. This
corresponds to a situation in which there is vertical quality differentiation between the two
operators and where operator 1 offers higher quality. Correspondingly, ifU1 ≤ −θ operator 2
offers higher quality.
At t = 2, consumers expect prices b p1 and b p2. At this stage, they have learned their locations t
but they do not yet know their addresses y.
We can now state the following result (the proof is relegated to the appendix).
Lemma 1. The expected utility of a consumer of type t who intends to migrate to VoIP is
r −τt − θ
2 − e p(b p1, b p2) where
e p(b p1, b p2) ≡ s1(b p1, b p2)(b p1−U1)+s2(b p1, b p2)b p2+
θ
2
[s1(b p1, b p2)2+s2(b p1, b p2)2−1].
Function e p(b p1, b p2) will be called the “adjusted average price” for VoIP services. Compared to
the average price for VoIP services, it is adjusted in order to take into account the potentially
asymmetric utility levelU1 as well as the expected reduction in utility from not consuming the
ideal product speciﬁcation. It is straightforward to show that e p(b p1, b p2) can be simpliﬁed into
e p(b p1, b p2) = s1(b p1, b p2)(b p1−U1)+s2(b p1, b p2)b p2−θs1(b p1, b p2)s2(b p1, b p2). (3.1)
The expected utility derived from staying with the PSTN service is r +U0−τ(1−t)− θ
2 − p0.
Accordingly, at t = 2, the location t of the consumer who, given his beliefs about VoIP prices, is




− p0 = r −τt −
θ
2
− e p(b p1, b p2).
Therefore, the fraction of consumers opting for VoIP services, that is, all consumers located at
t <t, is given by




p0−U0− e p(b p1, b p2)
2τ
.
19The fraction of consumers staying with the PSTN network is then, by deﬁnition, equal to
λ0(p0, b p1, b p2) = 1−λ(p0, b p1, b p2).
At t = 2, for given consumer beliefs, λ(p0, b p1, b p2) and λ0(p0, b p1, b p2) are ﬁxed. Note that at
this stage, again because expectations are given, also function e p(b p1, b p2) can be treated as a
constant denoted by e p. Then, for given consumer choices with regard to PSTN versus VoIP, it
can be shown that the Nash equilibrium at t = 2 is characterized by the following prices:




















Some interim observations can be made from equations (3.2)-(3.3) under the assumption that e p
is ﬁxed. Clearly, if the VoIP services are closer substitutes (θ smaller), then lower prices result.
Brand loyalty or superior performance of ﬁrm 1’s VoIP services (U1 > 0) translate into a higher
price p1. Finally, provided that the last term in the pricing equations is sufﬁciently small, a
higher access price translates into higher prices. Furthermore, ﬁrm 2’s price-cost margin is not
affected by the access price since p2 =
3θ−U1
3 +λ0(p0, b p1, b p2)a. Hence, for ﬁxed beliefs, the
entrant’s proﬁts are unaffected by a change in the access price.
Still given the assumption that e p is ﬁxed, we also observe that a higher price in the PSTN
segment translates into lower prices for VoIP services. This is due to the cost effect that a higher
p0 will lead to less demand for PSTN services, which reduces the likelihood that subscribers to
operator 2’s VoIP service make use of terminating access to the PSTN network. This
corresponds to lower perceived costs for operator 2, and hence, a more competitive outcome.
The reverse holds for the adjusted average VoIP price e p, and for the ﬁxed-utility advantage of
PSTN compared to VoIP services, U0.
For (3.2)-(3.3) to be an equilibrium, beliefs must be conﬁrmed, that is, it must be that
p1(p0, e p) = b p1 and p2(p0, e p) = b p2. If we deﬁne, based on (3.1),
g(e p) ≡ s1(p1(p0, e p),p2(p0, e p))(p1(p0, e p)−U1)+s2(p1(p0, e p),p2(p0, e p))p2(p0, e p)
−θs1(p1(p0, e p),p2(p0, e p))s2(p1(p0, e p),p2(p0, e p)),
then the equilibrium value e p∗ is deﬁned as a ﬁxed point of g(·). One can verify that g(·) is linear
in e p, so that there exists a unique solution:
e p∗ =




The interpretation is that the quality-adjusted average price for VoIP services is decreasing in U1
(for θ not too small). For a > 0, it is increasingU0, and decreasing in p0. The latter two
properties can be explained by the fact that an decrease inU0− p0 makes migration to VoIP
more attractive, everything else equal, as explained above. Therefore, in an equilibrium
outcome, pricing in the VoIP segment becomes more competitive (and therefore, e p∗ falls).
20We restrict our analysis to moderate levels of the terminating access price.
Assumption: a < 2τ.










Using this expression we obtain equilibrium prices for VoIP services.
Lemma 2. When consumers choose between VoIP and PSTN, equilibrium prices are given by
p∗





















If an equilibrium exists, it is unique (given by (3.5)-(3.6)). In order for p∗
1 and p∗
2 to be
proﬁt-maximizing prices, the following second-order condition has to be satisﬁed:
−
U2
1 +18U1θ +9θ(4τ −4a+4p0−3θ −4U0)
36θ2(2τ −a)
< 0.
This condition is equivalent to λ∗ > 0, and is always be satisﬁed in an interior equilibrium.
















The equilibrium expression for ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt is somewhat more involved.
Remark: Since we are interested in the migration from PSTN to VoIP we analyze only interior
equilibria. Let us brieﬂy comment on the possibility that full migration to VoIP is an
equilibrium. We will see that for a range of parameter constellations there exist multiple
equilibria. For a given price p0, a consumer of type t = 1 has expected utility from
PSTN-telephony equal to r +U0−θ/2− p0. In equilibrium his expected utility for VoIP






2. Note that in an interior
equilibrium a consumer of type t = 1 must strictly prefer PSTN. However, in such an
21equilibrium VoIP prices are higher than in a situation in which all consumers have migrated.
Therefore, denoting equilibrium values for a = 0 with superscript 0, the condition for the
existence of an equilibrium in which all consumers have migrated to VoIP is








3.2.1 The PSTN terminating access price
Note that for a given number of VoIP customers a higher access charge implies that the entrant
faces higher perceived marginal costs and the incumbent a higher opportunity cost to attract
customers in the VoIP segment. This shifts the reaction curve of both operators outward. Since
products are strategic complements under price competition, retail prices are inﬂated.17 Note
that higher perceived costs are also passed on to consumers. In particular, p∗
2 −λ0a = θ −U1/3,
which, again, is independent of a and market shares s∗
i are independent of a. However, ﬁrm 2’s
proﬁts are not neutral to the access price. The reason is that consumers, anticipating higher VoIP
prices, become more reluctant to migrate to VoIP, that is ∂λ∗
0/∂a > 0.18 Formally, taking















Prices respond more strongly to changes in the access price if the access price is already high,
that is, p∗














(2τ −a)2 > 0.
Consider now the change of ﬁrm 2’s equilibrium proﬁt in response the change in the access












Our main comparative statics result can be summarized as follows.
Result 1. For a given PSTN price, a higher access price for call termination on the PSTN
network leads to
(i) a smaller customer base for VoIP telephony;
17 Note that in standard models of price competition with differentiated products ﬁrms offer strategic complements. This
gives rise to monotone comparative statics properties (see e.g. Vives, 1990, and Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). For a
recent overview of the literature on strategic complementarites see e.g. Vives (2005). For a ﬁrst application of the theory
to telecommunications markets see Peitz (2005). In our simple price competition model, VoIP prices are indeed strategic
complements.
18 From equation (3.4) it can be directly seen that indeed ∂λ0/∂a > 0 whenever λ0 > 0.
22(ii) higher prices for VoIP telephony; and
(iii) lower proﬁts for operator 2.
We will illustrate the equilibrium properties with some diagrams based on a numerical example.
Suppose that p0 = 0.25, θ = τ = 1, r = 10,U0 =U1 = 0, and c = 0.1. The condition for an
interior solution then requires that a < 0.5. We will therefore look at the implications for
a ∈ [0,0.5].19 Figure 3.1 contains various illustrations of the equilibrium properties.
Figure 3.1 Illustration of the equilibrium outcome when the PSTN retail price is exogenously given
￿





































































As illustrated in ﬁgure 3.1, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt may be partly increasing and partly decreasing in the
access price a. This is the case for p0 sufﬁciently large. For small values of access price a, a
PSTN consumer is then in expectations more valuable for ﬁrm 1 than a VoIP consumer. Thus, an
increase in a which shifts consumers from the VoIP to the PSTN segment is proﬁt increasing.
This explains why ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts are initially increasing in a. This no longer holds for larger a.
19 We have checked the robustness of the effects on surplus levels by varying parameter values. The qualitative
observations discussed above are robust to such changes.
23The reason is that for larger a, competition in the VoIP segment is more relaxed so that, for retail
prices in the VoIP segment above a certain level, a consumer in the VoIP segment is in
expectations more valuable than a consumer in the PSTN segment. Firm 1 may therefore obtain
a larger proﬁt with a lower access price since this implies a larger VoIP segment.
This result suggests that it is not necessarily in the interest of ﬁrm 1 to lobby for a high access
charge. In particular, if p0 is sufﬁciently small, then ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt is globally decreasing in a
(note: this is not illustrated in the ﬁgure). The reason is the following: With a higher access price
a consumers expect the VoIP segment to be less competitive. Therefore only few consumers
decide to migrate to the VoIP segment. Since the PSTN-segment is not very proﬁtable, ﬁrm 1
would be better off if many consumers would migrate. Interestingly, to the extent that ﬁrm 1 can
inﬂuenceU0 it has no incentive to improve the quality of PSTN services. Rather the opposite is
true, since it would like to convince consumers to move to the VoIP segment.
More generally, one can observe that the larger p0, the larger the proﬁt-maximizing access
price. Again the argument is that relaxed competition in the VoIP segment (and thus a smaller
market share of VoIP) is in the interest of ﬁrm 1 if retail price regulation in the PSTN is less
strict (to the effect that PSTN customers are more valuable).
Figure 3.1 shows that total welfare is decreasing in a, which may appear to be surprising as
the policy implication is that a should be lower than marginal cost. However, note that we
assumed that there is full participation so that retail price levels do not affect participation. This,
in turn, implies that all welfare results are driven by the division of the market among PSTN and
VoIP, and in the VoIP segment, the division between the two operators. For the speciﬁc
parameter values that we chose, it turns out that the welfare-maximizing size of the VoIP
segment is as large as possible (under the restriction that a ≥ 0). Finally note that in general
VoIP prices are increasing in a. Therefore all consumers are necessarily (weakly) worse off after
an increase of the access price.
3.2.2 The PSTN retail price
Recall our assumption that the retail price for PSTN services is regulated. While this is no longer
an appropriate description in those countries in which retail regulation has been phased out, it
still can be used as a useful benchmark since various forms of wholesale regulation affect retail
prices in the PSTN segment (e.g. resale competition limit the incumbent’s market power in the
retail market). Thus the ﬁxed price for PSTN that we assume in our model, can be seen as a
simpliﬁcation of situations in which the PSTN price is less ﬂexible than VoIP prices, for instance
due to regulatory measures that lead to unbundling and resale-based competition in the PSTN
segment.
It is interesting to see how our results depend on the level of the PSTN retail price. We can
make a number of observations, mostly based on (3.5)-(3.6):
24Result 2.
(i) A higher price for PSTN telephony leads to a larger customer base for VoIP telephony.
(ii) Provided that the PSTN access price is positive, a higher price for PSTN telephony leads to
lower prices for VoIP telephony.
(iii) Provided that the PSTN access price is zero, a higher price for PSTN telephony does not
affect prices for VoIP telephony.
(iv) A higher price for PSTN telephony increases the entrant’s proﬁts.
Observation (i) is not surprising: if PSTN telephony becomes more expensive, more consumers









a < 0, i = 1,2,
is that an increase in p0 reduces the size of the segment of PSTN customers, which in turn
reduces the probability that a customer of operator 2 makes a call to the PSTN network. Hence,
because of the reduction in expected access payments to the incumbent, operator 2’s perceived
marginal cost is reduced. The result is a more competitive outcome in the VoIP segment, as has
been explained before. Thus a higher price in the PSTN segment leads to a lower prices in the
VoIP segment so that products across segments are strategic substitutes. Note, however, that if
the incumbent’s access price for termination on the PSTN network is zero, then the entrant’s
perceived marginal cost remains unaffected if the number of PSTN customers decreases.
An increase in p0 has the same effect on prices in the VoIP segment as an increase in the
ﬁxed utility of PSTN telephony. More precisely, a larger value forU0 increases the customer




> 0, i = 1,2.













The reason is that such a higher price leads to more migration to the VoIP segment. This effect is
reinforced because such migration leads to lower perceived costs of ﬁrm 2 and thus, with
fulﬁlled expectations, makes the VoIP segment more attractive. Due to the expansion of the VoIP
segment, the entrant beneﬁts from such a change.
Finally, we turn to the comparative statics properties of ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts. Firm 1’s proﬁt is
increasing in p0 for p0 small. This is hardly surprising since a high retail price in the PSTN
segment directly feeds into proﬁts. A possibly countervailing effect is that ﬁrm 1 loses market
share in the retail market. However, as long as a consumers in the VoIP segment is in
25expectations more valuable than a consumer in the PSTN segment, migration from PSTN to
VoIP is good news for ﬁrm 1. For large p0 the effect is reversed. Thus, for a given a there is a
ﬁnite proﬁt-maximizing retail price for PSTN telephony. The reason is that although ﬁrm 1
wants to milk its PSTN customers it cannot price too high in order not to loose consumers to
VoIP. Thus, strengthening the VoIP segment increases the disciplinary pressure on the PSTN
operator in the retail market. Whether this force is sufﬁciently strong to allow for deregulation of
p0 is an empirical issue.
3.3 Access regulation when the PSTN retail price is endogenous
As an extension of the model, consider two ways in which the PSTN price p0 may be
endogenous.
(i) Resale competition in the PSTN segment: Suppose that due to regulation of the
incumbent’s originating access price (equal to a0), there is intense competition in the PSTN
segment. Note that each of these entrants faces a perceived marginal cost of λ0a+a0.
Competition then drives down the incumbent’s retail price to p0 = λ0a+a0. Suppose that for
given access prices, equilibrium prices p∗
1 and p∗
2 have been determined. Then p0 is obtained as
the ﬁxed point of p0 = λ∗
0(p0,p∗
1,p∗
2)a+a0. Notice that the operators, when choosing prices in
the VoIP segment, do not take into account that p0 affects the size of the VoIP segment (at the
moment they choose VoIP prices, consumers already have made their migration decision).
The effect of access price a is now as follows. The access price a does not affect the size of
the VoIP segment λ (nor does it affect market shares within that segment). An increase in a leads
to higher retail prices in both segments and thus reduces bothCSPSTN andCSVoIP. It increases
the incumbent’s proﬁts while leaving the entrant’s proﬁts unaffected. Overall, welfareW is not
affected. Accordingly, the model’s outcomes are similar to the outcomes of a model in which
there is no migration between technologies (see also De Bijl and Peitz, 2006).
(ii) Sequential price setting: Consider the case in which operator 1 is be a monopolist in the
PSTN segment and is able to set a proﬁt-maximizing price p0. We assume that operator 1
chooses p0 after all parameters are set but before the rest of the game evolves. Hence the
incumbent takes into account the equilibrium prices from competition in the VoIP segment by
using backward induction.20
Given the PSTN access price and the equilibrium outcome in the VoIP segment, operator 1
chooses p0 to maximize proﬁts π(p∗
1,p∗
2;a,p0). One can show that this proﬁt function is




1 +10U1θ −3θ(−4c+4U0+θ −4τ))+2τ(U2
1 −6U1θ +9θ(4c+4U0+5θ +4τ))].
20 This timing can be motivated by the fact that the incumbent is less ﬂexible in setting PSTN prices than in setting VoIP
prices. E.g., because of universal service obligations, the incumbent may need to obtain regulatory approval.
26The following result, which we state without proof, conﬁrms Result 2 for the case that the PSTN
retail price is not ﬁxed:
Result 3. For endogenous p0, a higher access price for call termination on the PSTN network
leads to
(i) a smaller customer base for VoIP telephony;
(ii) higher prices for VoIP telephony; and
(iii) lower proﬁts for operator 2.
We brieﬂy discuss some equilibrium properties; for a numerical illustration, see De Bijl and
Peitz (2006). The PSTN price p∗
0 may be decreasing or increasing in access price a, and p∗
0(a)
may be U-shaped. This can be explained as follows. The incumbent makes proﬁts from selling
wholesale access in the PSTN segment, and from selling retail services both in the PSTN and the
VoIP segment. Recall that an increase in the access price (for given p0) leads to higher VoIP
prices. Hence for a given p0, a higher access price reduces the VoIP segment. However, the
incumbent can adjust p0. For low levels of a, an increase feeds only weakly into higher VoIP
prices. Since PSTN customers are very valuable at low levels of a, it is proﬁt maximizing for the
incumbent to reduce p0. At higher levels of a an increase feeds strongly into higher VoIP prices,
as VoIP consumers are, in expectation, rather valuable for the incumbent. He therefore reduces
the reduction of the size of the VoIP segment (the reduction that would occur with a constant p0)
by increasing its PSTN price.
Note that in general, a higher terminating access price a leads to larger PSTN segment. For
relatively low levels of the access price, the incumbent decreases its PSTN price to beneﬁt from
an even larger PSTN segment. This implies that PSTN consumers beneﬁt from a moderately
high access price. VoIP customers suffer and there is less migration to VoIP. To the extent that
our model approximates current telecommunications markets in which the incumbent enjoys
market power in the PSTN segment, our ﬁndings run counter to the view that a higher access
charge would lead to a decline of the PSTN segment; for instance, a recent OECD report
(OECD, 2006, p. 28) contains a statement to this effect.
Note that total welfare is concave in a. To see this, recall that welfare results are driven by
the division of the market among PSTN and VoIP, and in the VoIP segment, the division between
the two operators. The regulator may use a to implement the optimal split between the segments,
which explains why the optimal access price need not be equal to marginal cost.
27284 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored competition between an incumbent offering both PSTN and VoIP
telephony, and an entrant active only in the VoIP segment. Our analysis has shed light on the
effects of regulation in one segment on competition in another, unregulated segment, and has
focused on cost effects of access price regulation. Given the publication of reports such as
OECD (2006), this type of analysis is urgently called for.
We shortly discuss our main results, ﬁrst with respect to the regulation of the PSTN retail
price and second with respect to access price regulation. We then conclude by addressing a
couple of limitations of our analysis which suggest avenues for further research.
Regulation of the PSTN retail price: The PSTN retail price only affects competition in the
VoIP segment as a consequence of the endogenous nature of consumers’ technology adoption
decisions. An important result of the analysis is that, as long as the PSTN access price is
positive, a higher price for PSTN telephony leads to lower prices for VoIP telephony. Only for an
access price equal to zero, the retail price level of PSTN telephony does not affect retail prices
for VoIP telephony. These results illustrate the links between different telephony
networks—links that should not be ignored by regulators. These links have been explored in
detail. Suppose that an entrant in the VoIP market faces a positive access price. This access price
may or may not reﬂect marginal cost levels; it is only important that this access price is positive.
Then a lower regulated PSTN price leads to a smaller customer base for VoIP telephony and
softens price competition among VoIP operators.
Note that if a regulator allows an integrated incumbent to include a mark-up for common
costs in its access charge, which is typically the case, then the access price will be above the
marginal cost level. The result is less migration to VoIP. Also note that, if a universal service
obligation forces the incumbent to price PSTN telephony at a low level, VoIP retail prices
become inﬂated and the adoption of VoIP will be slowed down.
Access regulation: Access regulation on the PSTN network affects the VoIP market. For
instance, if the incumbent charges for call termination on the PSTN and VoIP networks use
bill-and-keep, then a higher access price for call termination on the PSTN network leads to a
smaller customer base for VoIP telephony. In the context of access price regulation it is
important that regulators take into account these linkages between different market segments,
and that regulation within one segment may have spillover effects to other segments.
In markets in which the PSTN retail price is not regulated (and in which an incumbent enjoys
market power), a higher access price leads to higher VoIP retail prices (as in the regulated case)
but tends to lead to lower retail prices in the PSTN segment. This suggests that regulation has
winners and losers: consumers of the “old” technology are the winners from a high access price
(which can be seen as a protective measure for the old technology) and consumer of the “new”
technology are the losers.
29Limitations and avenues for further research: Our modelling strategy has been to isolate the cost
effects of access price regulation abstracting from at least two important issues, vertical
integration and predation. Recall that vertical integration in our model with a given PSTN price
is neutral to competition, that is, retail prices in the VoIP segment are independent of whether or
not the PSTN operator is vertically integrated into VoIP. Thus cannibalization is not an issue.
This result is due to the particular timing in our model: an integrated ﬁrm with a regulated PSTN
price cannot commit to a high VoIP price (which would avoid cannibalization).21 We make three
observations related to vertical integration. First, since a lower access price leads to higher retail
proﬁts in the VoIP segment, a vertically integrated PSTN incumbent has less incentives to lobby
for an increase in the access price than a non-integrated PSTN operator (also, within a
cost-based regulatory regime it may have more ﬂexibility to adjust the access price due to some
arbitrariness in attributing common costs). Second, the ﬁrm can possibly commit not to offer
VoIP services at all. If we introduce this possibility in our model, there is a range of parameters
where this is indeed the proﬁt maximizing solution for the incumbent. By not offering VoIP
services it relaxes competition in the VoIP segment thus making consumers reluctant to migrate
to VoIP. Third, if we endogenize the PSTN price, our model no longer has the property that
integration is neutral to competition. An integrated ﬁrm takes proﬁts from retail in the VoIP
segment into account and adjusts the PSTN price accordingly.
Finally, we note that in our model, predation is not an issue. Predation tends to make the
incumbent more aggressive in the VoIP market as an attempt to maintain its customer base. Such
predatory behavior arises in dynamic models, in particular with consumer switching costs. We
leave it for future research to analyze predatory behavior in the context of VoIP.
21 The cannibalization issue would arise in a model in which consumers make their purchasing decision after observing
all prices. The corresponding model is less tractable since market shares are more complicated functions. However we
have solved this alternative model numerically. Our qualitative ﬁndings that the access price is not neutral to the entrant’s
proﬁts are conﬁrmed in this alternative setting, provided the PSTN retail price is given.
30Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1.
The expected utility of a consumer of type t who intends to migrate to VoIP is determined as
follows:
Z s1(b p1,b p2)
0
[r +U1−τt −θy − p1]dy +
Z 1
s1(b p1,b p2)
[r −τt −θ(1−y)− p2]dy
= s1(b p1, b p2)r +s1(b p1, b p2)U1−s1(b p1, b p2)τt −θ
s1(b p1, b p2)2
2
−s1(b p1, b p2)b p1
+s2(b p1, b p2)r −s2(b p1, b p2)τt −θ
s2(b p1, b p2)2
2
−s2(b p1, b p2)b p2
= r −τt −s1(b p1, b p2)(b p1−U1)−s2(b p1, b p2)b p2−
θ
2
[s1(b p1, b p2)2+s2(b p1, b p2)2]
= r −τt −
θ
2
−s1(b p1, b p2)(b p1−U1)−s2(b p1, b p2)b p2−
θ
2
[s1(b p1, b p2)2+s2(b p1, b p2)2−1]
= r −τt −
θ
2
− e p(b p1, b p2),
where
e p(b p1, b p2) ≡ s1(b p1, b p2)(b p1−U1)+s2(b p1, b p2)b p2+
θ
2
[s1(b p1, b p2)2+s2(b p1, b p2)2−1].
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